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CHAPTER ONE 
FALSITY IN 
MENTAL REPRESENTATION 
Theories of semantics try to explain the relationship between a mentalt 
representation and the thing it represents; to explain, for instance, how my 
coffee representation represents coffee. (Here and in the rest of this thesis, I use 
the convention of writing the label for a representation in bold type.) In many 
traditional theories of semantics, the relationship between my coffee 
representation and coffee is usually explained by recourse to causal relations 
between coffee and this representation. But attempts at explanations along 
these lines have many problems, among them the problem that it is difficult to 
find a plausible way of accounting for the fact that representations are able to 
misrepresent-or have false content. Sometimes I can think "that's coffee" 
when what's actually in the cup being handed to me is tea. Getting this fact to 
sit happily with accounts of the relation between my coffee representation and 
coffee hasn't been an easy task. Traditional approaches to this problem haven't 
had a lot of success so far in explaining how a representation can misrepresent. 
In this thesis I aim to avoid the problems with these traditional approaches, and 
find a causally-based, biologically realistic way to explain semantic relations 
between mental representations and objects in the world, which is also capable 
of explaining misrepresentation. 
The best place to start such an endeavour is to examine what the problem 
of representation and misrepresentation is, and the general tactics used in 
traditional attempts to solve this problem. This will illustrate why 
misrepresentation appears to be so intractable. Through such an examination 
we can get a close look at the traditional approaches, and their assumptions 
about what representations are, what sorts of things they represent, and how 
they can represent what they represent. We can also get a good view of the 
unquestioned assumptions these traditional theories are based on. This will 
give us a good place to start. I'm going to argue that if we want to achieve our 
1 I am using 'mental' here, and in the rest of this paper in the sense of 'neurological'. I do not me.an anything 
along the lines of 'non-physical'. 
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aim of a biologically realistic theory of semantics which shows how 
representations can misrepresent, we'll need an approach to the problem which 
does not take these assumptions as foundations. In this thesis I aim to 
construct an account which isn't based on these assumptions. 
1.1 The "Crude Causal Theory": Why misrepresentation is 
impossible. 
allegedly 
The first thing to do then, is to set out exactly what the problem is. The 
relationship between a representation and the objects it represents is usually 
explained causally. That is, representation represents whatever objects cause its 
activation. More precisely, a representation represents those objects which can 
cause its activation, or which reliahly cause its activation, or which causes its 
activation in a law-like manner (these are all equivalent to this basic theory). 
The following example,2 will give a good illustration. Say a person, let's call her 
Diedre, has a representation kangaroo, which she has been trained to activate in 
situations where a kangaroo is present and not to activate in situations where a 
kangaroo is not present. The result is that Diedre's kangaroo representation is 
activated whenever Diedre comes into contact with (or perceives) a kangaroo. 
Thus since kangaroo is activated by kangaroos, it represents kangaroos. So in 
general: 
• If X situations cause the activation of representation R, R represents Xs . 
Fodor3 calls this the "Crude Causal Theory". Figure 1.1 illustrates this view: a 
representation represents whatever object can cause its activation. 
.... Causes Physical Rep re sen ta tion .... Represents 
..... Object 
.. 
Figure 1.1: Crude Causal Theory's account of represent.ition. 
The problem with this Crude Causal Theory, however is that 'it makes 
misrepresentation impossible. Imagine that one day Diedre perceives a wallaby, 
and this also activates Diedre's kangaroo representation. In such a situation we 
2 
3 
This ex.,mple is stolen and adapted from Kim Sterelney (1990) p122. 
Fodor (1990) 
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would like be able to say that the wallaby is misrepresented as a kangaroo, and 
the representation has the false content 'that's a kangaroo'. But unfortunately 
this won't work. The Crude Causal Theory's central tenet is that a 
representation represents whatever object can cause its activation. So if a 
wallaby can also cause kangaroo to be activated, then kangaroo does not 
represent kangaroos only. It must represent wallabies as well- at least those 
wallabies which can cause kangaroo to be activated. Fodor calls this the 
"disjunction problem". According to Fodor, kangaroo represents (the 
"disjunctive" class) either a kangaroo or a wallaby, for which I'll use the 
notation <kangaroo or wallaby>. The problem is that such disjunctive 
representations cannot have false content. When a wallaby activates Diedre's 
kangaroo representation, her representation doesn't have a false content; it has 
the true (disjunctive) content 'tltat's either a kangaroo or it's a wallabt;.' 
• If R represents the disjunction <X or Y>, then a Y-caused activation of R does 
not have a false content. 
The upshot is that there is no way Diedre can mis-represent anything. 
Anything that can cause the activation of Diedre's kangaroo representation, will 
automatically have to be included in the disjunction of things it represents. 
Consequently, this representation can never be activated by something other 
than the things it represents. 
However, we do want a semantic theory to allow it to be possible for 
representations to misrepresent, to have false content. Falsity is an important 
semantic notion. A semantic theory which doesn' t allow representations to 
have false contents can't be a complete semantic theory. 
1.2 Moving on from the Crude Causal Theory 
The traditional way of getting around this problem is to refine our definition of 
the class of things a representation represents. We do this by denying that a 
representation represents wl1atever can cause its activation. Instead we set aside 
some special circumstances and say that a representation represents whatever 
causes its activation in tl1ese special circumstances. Thus the representation is 
capable of misrepresentation when activated by something other than the 
things which caused its activation in those special circumstances. 
One way of specifying these special circumstances which define the sort of 
thing a representation represents, is to use the causal relations between objects 
and the representation at a certain time. For example, the period in which a 
Chapter One Falsity in Mental Representation 4 
concept is being formed, or what is sometimes termed the "learning period."4 
The basic idea is that a representation's content, which specifies the things 
which that representation does and does not represent, is formed during the 
learning period. The learning period establishes that representation R 
represents a certain type of objects: those which cause its activation during the 
learning period. It's the teacher's responsibility to make sure that a wide 
enough sample of objects is used in training so that Xs and only Xs cause the 
activation of R. Because of this training, R comes to represent Xs. So in general: 
• Since R is activated in X situations and only in X situations during the 
learning period, R represents Xs . 
This move denies the idea that anything which ca uses the 
representation's activation is something the representation represents. Some 
things which cause the representation's activation after this learning period 
could be misrepresented rather than represented . 
• After the learning period, if Y were to happen (Y;tX), and Y activates R, then 
the R so activated would have the false content that Xis the case. 
For example, if a wallaby causes kangaroo to be activated (after the learning 
period), then kangaroo misrepresents the wallaby. Kangaroo has the false 
content that's a kangaroo when really what's there is a wallaby. 
1.3 The "Counter/actuals" Objection. 
Although this story appears to have merit at first glance, such a solution is 
hopeless (especially according to Fodor). The problem is that because of the 
nature of causation the learning period can't be insulated against 
misrepresentation. A causal theory of representational content must be 
governed by natural causal laws, and a natural causal law must include 
counterfactuals. However, the learning period story defies counterfactuals, and 
thus defies natural causal laws. Let me explain. A natural causal law does not 
merely relate causes and effects by stating that when C (the cause) happens then 
E (the effect) does happen. It states more generally that if C were to happen then 
E would happen. For instance, the causal law regarding the effects of gravity 
doesn't merely state that when I let go of this otherwise unsupported object it 
4 This point of view is due to Dretske (1981) . The exposition of it is Fodor's (1987), and the criticism of it 
which follows is Fodor's (1990) Crude Causal Theory's response to this idea, rather than any honest 
criticism. This is given as an illustration of CRUDE CAUSAL THEORY and its assumptions and limitations 
rather than an illustration of the 1imitations of Dretske's learning period theory. 
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does fall; it's more general than that. It encompasses the counterfactual, if I 
were to let it go (even if I don't), then it would fall. So: 
(1) If the statement "Y causes R after the learning period" is true, then 
(2) "Y can cause R after the learning period" is true. This means that 
(3) "Y can cause R" is true, and thus the counterfactual 
(4) "If Y were to happen, then Y would cause R" is true. Thus 
(5) "If Y were to happen (during the learning period), then Y would cause R" 
is also true. And so 
(6) "If Y had happened during the learning period (even if it didn't), then Y 
would have caused R" is also true. 
That is, if Diedre's perceiving a wallaby can cause kangaroo to be activated after 
the learning period, then if Diedre had perceived a wallaby during the learning 
period, even though this didn't happen, this also would have caused kangaroo 
to be activated. So if we allow counterfactuals, which we have to do because of 
the nature of causation, we're forced to conclude that the content established 
during the learning period isn't plain kangaroo after all, but must be 'either a 
kangaroo or a wallaby'. Indeed, the content of kangaroo isn't even 'either a 
kangaroo or a wallaby', but 'either a kangaroo or a wallaby or anything else 
which can cause this representation's activation after the learning period.' 
It's in the nature of causal laws that if (1) is true, then all the numbered 
statements above are true. Basically (5) and (6) stipulate that there is nothing 
especially sacred about the learning period. Whatever could cause kangaroo's 
activation after the learning period, would also cause its activation during the 
learning period. Thus since a wallaby could cause kangaroo's activation after 
the learning period, a wallaby would cause kangaroo's activation if it were 
presented during the learning period. And this is enough to include wallabies 
in the disjunction of things the representation represents. The point is that 
Diedre hasn't been trained to differentiate a kangaroo from a wallaby, and thus 
either would activate her kangaroo representation. And since kangaroo 
represents whatever did or would cause its activation during the learning 
period, the correlation established during the learning period is not between 
kangaroo and only kangaroos. The correlation is still between kangaroo and the 
disjunction <either a kangaroo or a wallaby>. 
If we think about the learning period in this way, the idea appears 
doomed. Training can't form a representation with a content guaranteed to be 
correct only when activated in certain situations. If the representation 
represents whatever activates it or would activate it during the learning period, 
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then there can't be "wil~" activations of a representation, ie. representations 
which have false contents; not even after the learning period. Diedre's 
kangaroo representation still represents the disjunction <kangaroo or wallaby>, 
despite her having been trained only on kangaroos. A wallaby can't cause a 
"wild" activation of kangaroo, so it can't cause a representation to have false 
content either. 
This means we still can't get the notion of falsity to be a part of our 
semantic theory. But falsity remains an important semantic notion we need to 
account for. So let's look a bit closer at the assumptions made in the above 
accounts, and see if challenging them can get us anywhere. 
1.4 Reject counterfactuals as irrelevant to this account of causation. 
The crucial phrase is "If we include counterfactuals, the correlation established 
during learning period is not between R and X, but between R and the 
disjunction <X or Y>". Perhaps we could reject counterfactuals. We could 
perhaps maintain that counterfactuals are irrelevant to the sort of causation we 
are dealing with here. 
Another way to put this worry, is to say that in order for the content of 
Diedre's kangaroo representation to be disjunctive, and to have the content 
that's eitlter a kangaroo or it's a wallaby, surely Diedre has to be aware that 
kangaroo represents wallabies as well as kangaroos. And in order for this to be 
the case it seems that she must have encountered wallabies before. 
We might well ask: how can Diedre be shown that "were a wallaby 
presented to you (which it hasn't), you would be tempted to call that a kangaroo 
too"? Or more to the point, how does one show. Diedre this, without showing 
her a wallaby? And if Diedre has never seen a wallaby, how can her 
representation represent this potential cause which hasn't happened as well as 
its actual causes? How could the wallaby bit get into the content of her 
representation if there's never been a wallaby in her perceptual history to cause 
this? Surely a causal theory of semantics only needs to have representations 
founded on the things that actually have caused them.5 
5 
Look at the example again. If we include counterfactuals, then because a 
Kim Sterelney questions the rejection of Dretske' s theory on these grounds also. He asks: 
" ... why is Dretske required to count these merely possible contingencies as undermining the 
claim that, in the learning period, the connection between stimulus and concept is nomic? A 
correlation does not fail to be reliable just because it is logically possible for it to fail, or even if 
it is nomically possible for it to fail. If that is necessary for reli.1bility, then no physical device 
is reliable." Sterelney (1990): pl 22. 
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wallaby would cause kangaroo to be activated (even though it hasn't), kangaroo 
also represents wallabies. Thus although Diedre has never seen a wallaby, her 
kangaroo representation has the disjunctive content 'that's either a kangaroo or 
a wallaby'. So if a wallaby did cause the activation of kangaroo, then kangaroo 
would have a true content, even though there's never been a wallaby in 
Diedre's perceptual history to cause this. This seems, on the face of it, more 
than a little weird. 
There's an "internal" side to this concern too. Is it not a little odd to say 
that Diedre has a representation half of whose content she is unaware of? After 
all, it's her representation. So shouldn't she know what its content is? It's as if 
someone could say to Diedre "Didn't you know that this is a part of the content 
of your representation too?" Maybe Diedre isn't an authority on what things 
can cause the activation of her representation, but surely she should be an 
authority on what her representation's content is. 
In contrast, suppose Diedre had encountered a wallaby before, and had 
not been corrected. In this case it would seem to be quite acceptable to say that 
her representation had the disjunctive content 'eitl,er a kangaroo or a wallaby', 
because both kangaroos and wallabies have caused the activation of her 
kangaroo representation. 
How much counterfactuals should worry us seems to depend on our 
interpretation of the sort of causal theory a causal account of representation 
really requires. The Crude Causal Theory defines the fundamental assumption 
of causal theories: representations represent the things which can cause their 
activation. But it doesn't seem necessary to claim that representations represent 
what would cause their activation, merely that they represent what has 
activated then so far. There seems a vast difference between 
(a)"Representations represent the things which would cause their activation" 
and (b)"Symbols represent the things which have caused their activation". On 
the face of it, (b) seems a much more sensible causal foundation for 
representation. 
However, as I will show in the next section, even this refinement takes 
us in the wrong direction. It seems feasible to worry about the merits of (b) over 
(a) only because the picture of a disjunctive representation we have been 
working with is misleading. We need a better picture of the sort of thing these 
"disjunctive" representations are and what sort of things they represent. When 
this is clear, it will also be clear that kangaroo can (correctly) represent a wallaby, 
without Diedre ever having seen a wallaby before. 
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1.5 The difference between disjunctions and descriptions. 
The problem with the above account is not so much a problem with 
counterfactuals, but a problem with our account of a disjunctive representation. 
The way things have been explained is confusing the issue. There are two 
factors which compound the confusion. 
A lot of the confusion is caused by calling Diedre's representation 
"kangaroo". This name is what gives kangaroo its inappropriate (but initially 
plausible) taxonomic flavour. It gives the impression that kangaroo should 
represent kangaroos and kangaroos only. This is just not so. Calling it 
"representation #7934" would have been a lot less leading. Our job then would 
be to explain how representation #7934 has the content it has, whatever that 
content is, rather than assuming it must obviously represent kangaroos and 
only kangaroos, and then trying to explain how it can have that content. 
But the confusion mainly comes from describing the representation's 
content as "disjunctive". Saying that kangaroo represents the disjunction 
<kangaroo or wallaby> is seriously misleading. Sure, if Diedre hasn't been 
trained to distinguish wallabies from kangaroos, then since wallabies are quite 
similar to kangaroos, a wallaby could activate kangaroo. But there is a better 
way of explaining this, which does not involve "disjunctions". 
Let's have a look at a slightly extreme training situation, to over-
emphasise this point, and hopefully clear up the confusion. Suppose Diedre is 
trained to recognise kangaroos by being shown lots of different kangaroos, in 
lots of situations, in lots of lighting conditions. Let's say that the only animals 
around in the learning period are kangaroos and walruses (I said it was going to 
be an extreme example). Diedre is shown the walruses as a contrast, and taught 
that these are not kangaroos. Thus kangaroo is activated by kangaroos, and not 
activated by the walruses. Because of this training Diedre can say "kangaroo" 
whenever kangaroos activate her kangaroo representation, and she won't say 
"kangaroo" when confronted by things (the walruses) which don't activate 
kangaroo. 
Diedre's training has only established her kangaroo representation 
specifically enough to distinguish between kangaroos and walruses, not between 
kangaroos and every other beast she will ever encounter (there are other beasts, 
we just haven't exposed Diedre to them yet). Diedre's training only included 
kangaroos and walruses, and there is a specific feature common to all the things 
that Diedre has been trained to use kangaroo to represent: they are beasts which 
get around by hopping on their back legs. As a result, her impression could be 
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that kangaroo represents things which propel themselves about by hopping on 
their back legs. In this situation Diedre's kangaroo representation would not 
have the content 'that's a kangaroo', so that it distinguishes kangaroos from 
everything else in her post-learning-period world. There is a very important 
difference between a representation with the content 'that's a kangaroo' (the 
content of a taxonomer's representation of a kangaroo, for instance) and one 
with the content 'that's a beast which gets around by !topping on its back legs' 
(the content of the representation of a person trained only on kangaroos and 
walruses). 
This difference makes all the difference. If Diedre's training only 
included kangaroos and walruses, and thus her impression is that kangaroo 
refers to things which propel themselves about by hopping on their back legs, 
then all sorts of things would correctly activate her representation. But even if 
this is so, saying that kangaroo has the disjunctive content <kangaroo or 
wallaby or rabbit or frog or toad or hopping spider or grasshopper> is a very 
rigid, categorical, and probably incomplete, way of specifying its content. A 
better way is to say that it has the descriptive (albeit vague) content 'a beast 
which gets about by /topping on its back legs '. 
A representation's content should be seen as descriptive, rather than 
disjunctive. No representation has a content which chops the world up into 
the nice, neat scientifically defined categories the Crude Causal Theory would 
like it to. 
The content of such a descriptive representation quite clearly depends on 
the training that established the representation's content. A person's 
representation is built up very subjectively. Only through her use of the 
representation-its behavioural manifestations-can anyone else get a clue as to 
whether the content of Diedre's kangaroo representation is similar to that of 
other people. If Diedre had encountered wallabies, toads, rabbits and frogs and 
so on, and called these "kangaroos", then the content of kangaroo could have 
been made much more specific by her being corrected by her teachers.6 
But even if the content of the representation was made more specific, by 
such extra training Diedre would never say that her representation's content is 
disjunctive. This is a dubiously theory-laden way of describing the content of a 
representation. A representation's content is not made more specific by having 
fewer and fewer disjuncts, it's made more specific by my making the description 
6 So the learning period idea was onto something. Training is very important in establishing a 
representation's content., but training doesn't have the function of establishing, for instance, that kangaroo 
will have true content only when activated by kangaroos. 
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less and less vague. So after being corrected about using the label "kangaroo" to 
refer to a frog, Diedre might agree that her representation's content was too 
vague, or not detailed enough. 
So we can see that the claim I made earlier, in section 1.4, looked sensible 
but really was quite mistaken. We were concerned, and it seemed right to be 
concerned, that if Diedre's kangaroo representation has the disjunctive content 
<kangaroo or wallaby> she must have encountered a wallaby before, and know 
her kangaroo representation represents wallabies as well as kangaroos. But now 
that we see the content as descriptive rather than disjunctive, we can 
understand that this is not so. She doesn't need to have encountered a wallaby 
for the representation with content 'that;s a thing which gets around by 
hopping' to be correctly activated by a wallaby. We must realise that the object 
of training isn't to conclusively establish the content of kangaroo so that it 
distinguishes kangaroos from every other beast Diedre is ever going to 
encounter. The object of training is to give her representation a content just 
general enough that she can deal with kangaroos effective! y. 
Our intuitions are that if Diedre calls something a "kangaroo" when it's a 
wallaby, then she must somehow be misrepresenting the wallaby, because she's 
put it in the kangaroo category, where it doesn't belong. But in fact our 
intuitions are wrong, although not for the reasons the Crude Causal Theory 
uses. Kangaroo has the content 'that's a thing wlticlt gets around by /topping'. 
So if a wallaby activates Diedre's kangaroo representation then she does not 
misrepresent the wallaby. She represents the wallaby as a beast that gets around 
by hopping, which is true of the wallaby. When Diedre meets a wallaby for the 
first time, it would activate kangaroo, and she would be quite right in what she 
means by saying "that's a kangaroo". What she means (i.e. the content of her 
representation) is that this is a beast which gets around by hopping on its back 
legs, which is true. But there is a difference between what she says and what she 
means. What she means is true, but what she says is false; that's not a kangaroo, 
it's a wallaby. But the fact is she has not mis-represented the wallaby; we could 
perhaps say that she has mis-labelled it. It is just that the representation which 
she associates with the word "kangaroo" is too vague. 
So if we see representations as having (more or less vague) descriptive 
contents, rather than disjunctive contents, we can see how it's possible for a 
wallaby to cause kangaroo to be activated; in which case the representation has 
the true content 'that's a beast whiclz gets about by hopping'. The 
representation's content is vague enough that it covers both wallabies and 
kangaroos. And this would be so both during and after the learning period, 
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whether or not Diedre has ever encountered a wallaby before. So we can't reject 
counterfactuals. If a wallaby could cause kangaroo to be activated after the 
learning period, then it would cause kangaroo to be activated during the 
learning period. Counterfactuals do matter in the causally-based relations 
between a representation and what it represents. 
Unfortunately then, we still haven't found an account of semantics in 
which a representation's content can be false; lack of falsity is still a problem 
here. For, so far, even a descriptive representation can't have a false content. 
Anything which would activate Diedre's kangaroo representation does so 
because the descriptive content 'that's a beast which gets about by hopping' is 
true of it. So even though characterising representations descriptively rather 
than disjunctively gives us a more plausible perspective on why these 
representations can't mis-represent, we still can't account for false content. All 
situations in which the representation is activated are situations in which the 
representation has a true content. We need to dig even deeper to find an 
account of mental representation in which falsity can play a part. There is one 
kind of bona fide mis-representation which hasn't been introduced so far. My 
suspicion is that a lot of what's happening here, the feeling of intractability 
about the problem, is because this sort of example hasn't been included yet. We 
need a richer diet of examples to get a better look at what misrepresentation is 
really all about. 
1.6 Use examples which really do exemplify misrepresentation. 
The "disjunction problem" states that anything which causes or would cause 
the activation of a representation is to be included in the disjunction of things 
the representation represents. I translated this as more of a vagueness problem. 
Some representations are vague, so that they apply to more than one similar 
thing. However, there are some cases in which very detailed and specific 
representations are activated by something which is later discovered not to be at 
all accurately represented by this representation. This sort of example, which is 
rare in the traditional literature, does provide an example of genuine 
misrepresentation. 
For example: I see someone from a distance walking down the street 
away from me, and I recognise this person as being Diedre; the walk is right, the 
clothes look like Diedre's typical apparel, and the hairstyle is right too. Thus my 
Diedre representation is activated, and has the content that's Diedre. But as I go 
running up to greet her, J. embarrassingly realise when I see this woman up 
Chapter One Falsity in Mental Representation 12 
close that she is not Diedre. 
This sort of situation is where mis-representation truly finds its home. 
And this sort of situation still needs to be accounted for; the way we've been 
describing things so far hasn't explained this sort of case. It's certainly not that 
my Diedre representation is disjunctive; it's not a representation whose content 
is <Diedre or this complete stranger>, or that's either Diedre or a complete 
stranger. And taking my representation's content descriptively, it's not that its 
content is too vague or badly-formed. The content of my Diedre representation 
is quite specific. It's at least specific enough to distinguish Diedre from the 
stranger; I know Diedre well, and can recognise that the stranger isn't Diedre 
when I see the stranger up close and from a better viewing angle. The problem 
here is not a problem with specifying the content of my representation. The 
problem is that I'm getting imperfect or incomplete information about my 
environment. Similar examples of genuine misrepresentation are those of the 
person who sees a possum up a tree in the dark and thinks it's a cat, the person 
who sees a cardboard cut-out cow in a paddock and takes it to be a real cow, and 
the myopic person who sees (without his glasses) his jersey crumpled up on a 
chair and believes it's the cat. 
It's important to notice that activating a representation involves some 
sort of recognition-a connection is made between the environmental 
information my senses pick up, and some aspect of my representation. When I 
thought the stranger was Diedre, the visual information I was picking up 
matched some of the visual aspects of my Diedre representation. But in this 
case the environmental information that my senses picked up wasn't complete. 
I was looking at the stranger from a distance, and she had her back to me. If I'd 
had more complete information to go on-if I'd seen the stranger from close up 
or had seen her face, for instance-then my Diedre representation would not 
have been activated. So what happened in this case is that the environmental 
information picked up by my sense organs activated a representation that 
wouldn't have been activated if the sensory information was of better quality, or 
had been more complete. 
Two points can be made here: 
• There are two types of example used in traditional accounts of 
misrepresentation, examples using representations like Diedre's kangaroo 
representation which are vague, and ones using representations like my 
Diedre representation, which are detailed, specific representations 
activated inappropriately. 
• The senses play the crucial role here-ignoring the role of the senses in 
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perception is one of the major deficiencies in traditional accounts. And to 
a large extent it's because they don't acknowledge the role of the senses 
that they don't see that there are two types of example here. 
I'll deal with these points in reverse order. I'll spend some time filling out 
the importance of the role of the senses in activating representations. After that 
I'll come back to discuss the examples used to illustrate accounts of 
misrepresentation,. Because they don't distinguish these two types, a significant 
proportion of the examples that are used are simply of the wrong sort. They 
often use vague representations which don't display genuine 
misrepresentation. 
1.7 The role of the senses in perception and representation. 
Realising that I don't always (or maybe ever) have access to the complete facts of 
the way the world is, is one of the major keys to solving the problem of 
representation and misrepresentation. I don't (and I can't) represent the way the 
world really is. Rather, I represent the way my senses portray my environment. 
My representations are activated by the environmental information picked up 
by my senses. My representations are not activated by objects. 
The representations we've been dealing with so far have been incapable 
of misrepresentation because they have been based upon a perspective in which 
plzysical objects cause my representation's activation. The Crude Causal Theory 
assumes that there is no (relevant) intermediary between objects and our 
representations of objects. The Crude Causal Theory's version of a 
representation is one which portrays the world as it "really is". Because 
representations represent the tlzings whiclz cause tlteir activation, all the Crude 
Causal Theory's representations are veridical by definition. 
I believe a perspective in which there is an intermediary between my 
representations and the world makes a lot more sense. The intermediary is my 
senses. All I really have access to are my sense-organs' outputs, and the way my 
senses portray the world to me. The properties of my sense-organs' outputs are 
what cause my representations' activation. But having said this, I don't believe 
that we first perceive this intermediary, and then "infer" the state of our 
environments from this. The senses causally mediate between objects and our 
representations, but there is no cognitive mediation here.7 (I'll explain why this 
7 See Ben-Zeev (1988) and Bradshaw (1991) for discussions of the difference between causal and cognitive 
mediation. 
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is so in the next chapter.) 
The senses' mediation makes all the difference. Misrepresentation occurs 
when my sense-organs don't accurately portray the state of the world. This can 
happen because the information they pick up is of poor quality due to bad 
lighting, or because I'm not wearing my glasses. Or it can happen because this 
information is incomplete, due to bad viewing angle, like seeing the stranger 
who looked like Diedre from behind, for instance. In such situations my sense 
organs' outputs could activate representations they would not activate if I had 
access to better quality or more complete information. And it is in precisely 
such situations, the representation which is activated can have false content. 
In order to explain how representations can misrepresent, and have false 
content, then we need to revise the traditional notion of the way 
representations are activated. We need an account in which the causes of my 
representations' activation are not physical objects, but the outputs of my sense 
organs. On such an account my representations do not represent the objects 
which caused their activation, because objects don't cause their activation at all. 
The outputs of the sense organs cause the activation of representations. Only 
with this perspective can representations have false contents 
When we put the sense organs in the picture, the diagram becomes: 
8 On good days I'd almost be prepared to give Fodor some credit in not holding the sense organs to be 
transparent. He does promote a "Slightly Less Crude Causal Theory of Conhmt", in which a sort of 
foundationalism (inference from sensory information} npplies: "The cnusal chain runs from horses in the 
world to horsey looks in the world to psychophysical concepts in the belief box to 'hores' in the belief 
box."Fodor (1987): pl 22. Or to put it Cranny's way: " ... having a HORSE concept requires that you be able 
to have certain experiences; and that you be prepared to take your having those experiences to be evidence 
for the presence of horses; and, indeed, that you can sometimes be rigi,t in taking your having those 
experiences to be evidence of horses." (also p122} I think Fodor's Cranny has a better version. 
I say I'd almost give Fodor credit for taking the sense organs into consideration because Fodor himself, if 
we ignore Cranny's comments as Fodor appears to do, still ignores the role of the sense organs, going from 
"horsey looks in the world" straigl,t to stuff in the belief box. (Unless "a horsey look in the world" is the 
outputs of the sense organs?? Fodor isn't clear on this.) 
And even in later work (especially when discussing Dretske) Fodor appears still committed to the idea 
that my horse representation is activated by objects, rather than experiences or "horsey looks" and that the 
representation therefore could only represent the object which caused its activation. See for example Fodor 
(1990): pp40-42, pp 57-64. 
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Thus when I saw the person on the street, and recognised her as Diedre, 
the stranger herself didn't cause Diedre's activation. Rather, because I didn't see 
her from close enough, and the viewing angle was not the best, the outputs of 
my visual sense-organs activated my Diedre representation. Because of this I 
misrepresented this stranger as Diedre. In this situation my representation had 
the genuinely false content 'that's Diedre'. 
1.8 Which cases properly qualify as examples of misrepresentation? 
It seems that many of the main players in the game approach the above 
question in different ways. Thus often when they think they're scoring points 
against each other, in reality they're not playing in the same ballpark, they 
might not even be playing the same game. Ignoring the role of the sense 
organs for the moment, as these theorists seem to do, the divisions between the 
positions seem to depend on whether they think a case of misrepresentation can 
be characterised by: 
(i) even though Xs and Ys equally can both cause representation R to be 
activated, R should only represent Xs, and thus when activated by a Y, R 
misrepresents the Y. 
(ii) when representation R happens to be activated by something which it 
shouldn't represent, like a Y for instance, R misrepresents the Y. 
More accurately, the divisions rest on whether these theorists notice that there 
is a difference between these two sorts of situations. There is a difference, and 
it's a very important one. 
I believe that version (i), the view held by many theorists, is responsible 
for misdirecting the debate. But type (i) cases, where a representation can be 
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activated by two or more different things, but sltould only represent some of 
these things which can cause its activation, don't exemplify misrepresentation 
but have vague descriptive contents which apply correctly to Xs and to Ys. And 
this is so even when we put the sense organs in the picture. Suppose we change 
(i) to read: 
(i') even though Xs and Ys can cause sensations which activate 
representation R , R sliould only represent Xs, and thus misrepresents 
when activated by sensations caused by a Y. 
Even then we still can't get representation R to misrepresent. The problem 
is that representations to which (i) applies are vague. If Xs and Ys can both 
cause sensations which activate R, then R's content isn't specific enough to 
differentiate between Xs and Ys. In such a type (i) situation, we can't say in any 
non-ad hoc. way that R sliould only represent Xs. If this "should" is based on 
anything, it must be based on the representation's content. The problem is that 
the representation's content is vague, so that it correctly represents both Xs and 
Ys. So we can't use this representation's content to specify that it "should" 
represent only Xs and not Ys. 
There is an important difference between the activation of vague 
representations like those just mentioned and the inappropriate activation of 
representations, as we find with type (ii) situations. The stranger causing 
sensations which activated my Diedre representation is an example of a type (ii) 
situation. Suppose we put the sense organs back in version (ii) as well. 
(ii') when representation R happens to be activated by sensations caused by 
something which R shouldn't represent, like a Y for instance, R 
misrepresents the Y. 
I want to insist that type (ii) situations, in which the representation is 
activated because I get poor quality or incomplete sense-information from an 
object, are the only places where we'll find genuine misrepresentation. 
So there is a difference between type (i) and type (ii) situations. Type (i) 
situations are ones in which a representation's content is vague, and so its 
content does correctly apply to the thing which caused the .sensations which 
activated it. Type (ii) situations are ones in which a representation's content is 
specific enough, but the representation is activated by sensations caused by 
something to which that content does not apply. Many theorists seem not to 
notice that there is a difference between type (i) and type (ii) situations. And 
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because they don't notice the difference, these theorists often use type (i) 
examples to illustrate their account of misrepresentation. But because these 
cases are open to the "disjunction problem" objection, they often are criticised 
because the example does not allow for the possibility of misrepresentation. 
Unfortunately these theorists are short-changing themselves. The failures are 
often taken, even by themselves, to be failures of their theories of 
representation, where the fault is rather with the examples they use. (Appendix 
One is a discussion of some of the more prevalent examples used in the 
literature, explaining whether these are type (i) or type (ii) cases. But be warned 
that it requires concepts I don't develop until Chapter Two.) This shows that if 
we're going to use examples of misrepresentation, we had better ensure that we 
use the right sort of examples: type (ii) ones which do display misrepresentation. 
In type (ii) cases my sense organs' outputs can activate representations they 
would not activate if the sensory information was more complete or of better 
quality. In such situations a representation will have a perfectly specific content, 
but this content won't apply to the object which caused the activating sensory 
outputs. That is, the representation will be incorrectly activated, and will 
misrepresent the object which caused the activating sensory outputs. 
This view of how mental representations can have false content fits 
perfectly to many familiar situations. As we' ve seen, it fits my Diedre 
representation being activated by the stranger seen from behind. But take a 
slightly different example: I'm not wearing my glasses, and see my grey jersey on 
the chair, and take it to be my grey tabby cat, Madison. Here I misrepresent the 
jersey as Madison. This time, rather than getting incomplete sense information, 
the sensory information picked up by my visual perceptual system is noisy, or of 
bad quality. But it's ridiculous to say that my Madison representation is 
disjunctive, and really represents the disjunction < Madison the cat or my grey 
jersey (when I'm not wearing my glasses, and I see it from far away)>. And it's 
equally ridiculous to say that my Madison representation is descriptive but 
vague, so vague that it covers both Madison and grey jerseys too. Indeed, what 
would a description which equally describes grey cats and grey jerseys seen 
without my glasses on even look like-a greyish something or other? What has 
happened in this case is that my senses translated information about my 
environment imperfectly because I wasn't wearing my glasses. Because of this, 
the visual information was noisy enough that some aspect of it fitted some 
aspect of my Madison representation. Because of this noisy sensory information 
my Madison representation was activated inappropriately; it would not have 
been activated if I had been wearing my glasses. Here we have a case where a 
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representation with a very specific content is activated by sensations caused by 
something that content doesn't correctly apply to. 
We could use two "tests" to check if any example is a type (i) or a type (ii) 
case. It would be a type (ii) situation, which does exemplify misrepresentation, 
if either of the following were the case: 
• If the environmental information was of better quality or less noisy, the 
same representation wouldn't be activated. 
• If I attempt to get more complete information, to activate the 
representation through other of its aspects (by looking from a different 
angle, by listening, smelling, feeling and/ or tasting as well as looking, or 
by looking closely at features not inspected originally) the same 
representation wouldn't be activated. 
The first test implies that if I improve the quality of the sensory 
information, by turning the lights on, by putting my glasses on, by moving to a 
distance where the object's features are more distinct, I could check whether this 
same representation would be activated. If this is a type (ii) situation then the 
aspect of the sensory information I was receiving would become better quality 
and I would realise my error; I'd most likely activate a different representation 
instead. This happened when I went up to pat Madison the cat when I my grey 
jersey activated this representation. As I moved closer and the sensory 
information got a little more distinct, I realised that this wasn't Madison the cat. 
My Madison representation was no longer activated. 
The second test probably played more of a part in my realising that the 
stranger wasn't Diedre. (In fact it probably also played some part in my realising 
that my jersey wasn't Madison too.) Here, rather than improving the quality of 
the sensory information which activated certain visual aspects of my Diedre 
representation, this way of testing attempts to activate other aspects of the same 
representation. For instance, if I walked around and saw her face, or if I heard 
her speaking and realised that her voice isn't anything like Diedre's, then this 
other sense-information would in some way inhibit Diedre's activation, because 
these are not aspects of that representation. 
To sum up: if we want a semantic theory to permit mental 
representations to have false contents, we need to allow for the fact that my 
senses mediate between my environment and my representations, and we also 
need to use the right examples to illustrate the explanation. We need to use 
cases where a representation misrepresents in the sense of representing 
something its content doesn't correctly apply to, because it was activated 
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inappropriately. And we need to acknowledge that this representation was 
activated inappropriately not by the wrong object, but because the outputs of the 
sense-organs carried incomplete or poor quality information. Being insensitive 
to these points is a major stumbling-block for many traditional approaches to 
the problem of misrepresentation. 
1.9 Traditional approaches to the problem: General Tactics. 
Nonetheless, there is a general tactic used in traditional approaches to the 
problem which merits examination and praise. The general tactic is this: It's 
clear that the Crude Causal Theory's thesis that a representation represents 
whatever can cause its activation won't do. Hence most theorists try to find a 
principled reason for saying that the representation represents the physical 
objects which cause its activation in certain "optimal" cases only, so that in 
other "non-optimal" cases it can misrepresent the object which caused its 
activation. (As I've just explained, many of these theories ignore the role of the 
sense organs.) This way of tackling the problem can be summarised as follows: 
A) In certain "optimal" situations, representation R represents the thing(s) 
which activated it. I'll call these things "Xs". 
B) In some situations we want to say that R misrepresents the thing which 
activated it. We can't justify calling this a case of misrepresentation just 
because this is a "non-optimal" situation, where the thing which activated R 
is a Y and not an X, because this would be ad hoc. and circular. 
C) Because of their realisation of point B, theorists such as Millikan, Dretske 
and Fodor (the prime examples, whose theories I'll concentrate on) each try 
to give a theory of representation which explains-in a principled, non-ad 
hoc., non-circular way-what the representation does (and does not) 
represent. They try to explain in such a way how R can correctly represent 
only Xs, and thus how it can misrepresent when activated by Ys.9 
9 Note that I haven't used the word "content" here. Most theories claim that the job to do is to specify the 
representation's content in a principled, non circular way. But the way "content" is used in the literature is 
dangerously ambiguous between what's inside the representation, and what's at the end of the represents 
relation. A confusion between these two is endemic. I've made this mistake myself often., and have had to 
catch myself over and over again. An example is the discussion about the difference between disjunctive 
contents and descriptive contents mentioned earlier in this chnpter. 
Because of this ambiguity I'm going to stop talking about content, and instead talk about the sort of 
object a representation should represent, or the sort of object the representation correctly represents. I take 
this to refer unambiguously to the entity at the business end of the represents relation. 
When I do get around to describing how we can specify the sort of object a representation should 
represent, I use a device which is neither part of the representntion itself, and nor is at the other end of the 
representation relation. Rather it sits outside the representation, but is used in establishing tlie way the 
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The general tactic then, is to explain what a representation represents first. 
How each of the main proponents tackle the problem of misrepresentation 
differs in how they establish how representation R is first able to represent Xs 
and thus to misrepresent Ys. 
Actually there are two versions of C). To establish how representation R 
is first able to represent Xs there are two approaches. Only the second uses the 
tactic I want to applaud. Bluntly, the difference between these tactics is this: 
Cl) Assume that representation R represents Xs. Use this to show how it can 
misrepresent Ys. 
C2) Show how representation R comes to represent the things it represents 
(which just happen to be Xs). Because of this it can misrepresent Ys. 
The Cl version is Fodor's. He tries to show how a representation can 
correctly represent one thing and misrepresent another using what he calls 
"asymmetrical dependence". He says that my Diedre representation's ability to 
misrepresent the stranger must be dependant on its ability to correctly represent 
Diedre; I couldn't misrepresent the stranger as Diedre unless I was able to 
correctly represent Diedre as Diedre. But this dependence is asymmetrical, it 
doesn't run the other way: my Diedre representation's ability to veridically 
represent Diedre doesn't depend on its ability to misrepresent the stranger. So 
R can misrepresent Ys because Y-caused activations of R are asymmetrically 
dependant on X-caused activations of R. 
The aspect of this tactic I'm wary of is that it starts with the finished 
representation. Accounts like this invoke the spectre of circularity. You must 
be able to explain in a non-circular way how R can represent only Xs, and thus 
can misrepresent Ys. This is not an easy task. 
Fodor's version of this story avoids the circularity by boot-strapping 
instead: he makes no attempt to explain how a representation can come to 
represent what it does. He avoids the responsibility for explaining how R comes 
to represent what it does, by hoping that he can help himself to the concept of 
an intact organism.10 To illustrate: he says that " ... misidentifying a cow as a 
horse wouldn't have led me to say 'horse' except tliat there was independently a 
semantic relation between 'horse' tokenings and horses." 11 Fodor shrugs off the 
represents relation points to what it does. 
10 Fodor (1987): pp106-110 and pp126-127. 
11 Fodor (1987): pl07. (His italics, my bolding.) 
12 Millik.1n (1984) and Dretske (1981). 
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responsibility of showing how this independently existing semantic relation is 
established. He starts out explaining how horse can misrepresent cows, by 
reference to its ability to correctly represent horses, without ever explaining how 
horse can come to correctly represent horses. 
Fodor starts out assuming that horse obviously represents horses, and 
tries to explain how it can misrepresent cows. Millikan and Dretske don't start 
off assuming that horse represents horses. Their (C2) accounts avoid the charge 
of circularity by starting at the other end. Rather than beginning with a fully 
developed representation R and trying to explain how it can represent only Xs 
and not Ys, we begin with the question, "How does R develop from scratch, so 
that it comes to represent the objects it does (whatever those objects are)." (How 
the representation develops explains how Diedre's kangaroo representation can 
be activated by both kangaroos and wallabies.) 
An explanation which starts with the raw material which develops to 
become the representation, doesn't incur any charges of being circular. The 
process is iterative rather than circular. Notice that by taking this tactic, these 
approaches explain how a representation comes to represent the object it 
represents, rather than asuming that, say, my kangaroo representation must 
have represent kangaroos. {Think about representation #7934 again.) 
One important lesson to learn here, is not to start an explanation of the 
sort of thing a representation represents with a look at the finished 
representation, and attempt a non-circular explanation of how that 
representation can represent what it does. Instead we describe how a 
representation develops from scratch, and in particular how it comes to 
represent the sort of thing it represents. By doing so we avoid any charges of 
being circular. Depending on how the representation has developed, the sort of 
thing the representation represents could be a vaguely specified class of things, 
or it could be quite specific, or it could be somewhere in between. 
Theories which take this tactic differ in the ways they think a 
representation develops, and thus how the sort of thing a representation 
represents should be specified: Millikan argues that representations have 
Natural functions which develop through evolution, and Dretske (in 1981) 
argued that learning during the "learning period" is what specifies the sort of 
thing a representation represents.12 Having accounted for what a representation 
correctly represents, these approaches then explain how because the 
representation correctly represents a certain sort of thing, it can misrepresent 
12 Millikan (1984) and Oretske (1981). 
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when its activation is caused by something other than this sort of thing. 
Dretske and Millikan take the following general tactic then: they firstly 
explain how a representation develops from scratch, in order to non-circularly 
explain how a representation comes to represent a certain sort of thing. With 
this established, they can determine when the representation veridically 
represents and when it misrepresents: it misrepresents when activated by 
objects other than this sort of object. (Or rather they should say: when activated 
by sensations caused by objects other than this sort of object.) Thus my Madison 
representation developed to represent a very specific class of things. It correctly 
represents a grey tabby cat with a big appetite, who lives at my house, who loves 
chocolate and cheese and who sheds hairs all over my favourite chair. So 
because grey jerseys are not the sort of thing this representation correctly 
represents, when Madsion is activated by my seeing, without my glasses on, my 
grey jersey where I left it on my favourite chair, it misrepresents the jersey 
This general tactic is one I'll use too. I will however need to revise, 
append and replace some of the assumptions made in traditional accounts of 
representation (some of which, alas, Dretske and Millikan also take on board). 
In the next section I'll mention these assumptions, and briefly sketch the ways 
I'll revise them. 
1.10 Some troublesome assumptions of traditional approaches to tlze problem of 
mis rep re sen ta tion. 
The following are a few assumptions which, it seems, most of the traditional 
attempts to solve this problem take on board. This thesis could be seen as an 
attempt to set out a new way of approaching the problem-a way which revises 
or rejects these assumptions: 
(a) Physical objects activate representations. 
(b) The sense organs' job is to convert the properties of objects into properties 
of representations of those objects. 
(c) In explaining how we represent our environments, how those 
representations are used is relatively unimportant. 
(d) Physical objects (as opposed to abstract ones) are the only kind of objects 
which can figure in an account of representation. 
I'll deal with these assumptions in sequence. 
I've already discussed the first of these. Assumption (a) refuses to take the 
sense organs into account. As I said earlier, because of the mediation of the 
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senses, a representation doesn't (correctly) represent everything which causes its 
activation, because things don't activate representations anyway. It's only the · 
outputs of the sense organs which do this. 
Assumption (b), that the sense organ's job is to convert the properties of 
objects into properties of representations also needs to be revised. In the next 
chapter I'll argue that seeing the senses as transducers of information provides a 
refreshing perspective, which makes a lot more sense than one based on 
assumption (b). The idea here is that there is a lot of information already 
contained in the light waves, sound waves and so on that impinge upon our 
sense organs. The senses' job is not to convert properties of objects into 
properties of representations of those objects, but to convert information 
implemented as light waves, to information implemented as neurological 
impulses; the same information is transduced into a form more accessible to 
our brain processes. 
We also need to reconsider the traditional perspective with regard to 
assumption (c). I'm going to show that the way a representation comes to 
represent what it does is intimately tied up with the way that representation is 
used in the production of behaviour. Our perceptions activate representations, 
and the activation of representations is used to produce actions appropriate to 
the situations and circumstances we represent ourselves as being in. A 
representation's job is not just to represent, but to coordinate action with 
perception. Traditional accounts need to take more notice of the relationships 
between perception and action which are embodied in our representations. 
Action and perception co-evolve, and by developing together the cognitive 
structures which undergird our representations are formed. Because of this co-
evolutionary development of action and perception, what a representation 
represents is given by the way it is used to coordinate action with perception. 
Assumption (d), that physical objects are the only kosher objects, and that 
abstract objects shouldn't figure in accounts of representation and 
misrepresentation can be rejected by looking at the developments made in the 
philosophy of language during the early part of this century. The work of 
Brentano, Twardowski, Meinong, and Frege showed that abstract objects must 
figure in our explanations of what a word means. As I'll show later on, the 
same goes for explanations of what a representation represents. 
In the next chapter, I'll start building a position which rejects the above 
assumptions. I'll attempt the task of providing an account of how a 
representation is activated, what a representation is, what a representation 
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represents, and how a representation represents whatever it represents which 
accords with the revisions of the above assumptions. This account will use the 
general tactic I mentioned earlier; the tactic of specifying how a representation 
develops so that it comes to represent what it does, and then using this to 
specify when a representation correctly represents and when it misrepresents. 
To do this, I'll begin in the next chapter by taking a close look at the "nuts and 
bolts" of how the outputs of the sense organs activate representations, the way 
the sense organs act as transducers of environmental information, and the way 
a representation could be implemented in the human brain. 
